J. Chan says:

This is a very fascinating book by Philip Selznick, whom as a thinker I first encountered in a public administration class a while ago. It is also a somewhat short book untypical for this subject; and upon first read, certainly feels unfinished and dissatisfying, as if Selznick was trying to cramp too many ideas in too few pages amid too short a time.

Yet, one can read Selznick’s project as one that aims to make reparations to the overall project of social science. In fact, it is commonly viewed that the enterprise of social science is in a state of general disrepair; and ‘natural-sciences envy’ is not all that uncommon in many disciplines within the social sciences. Here, we might come to expect that Selznick would engage in various tirades against transposed methods or assumptions implicit in disciplinary warfare, especially warfare between two perceivably incommensurable camps of thought between social and natural sciences.

But Selznick did nothing of this sort. Instead he proposes concepts and topics intimately associated with a humanist tradition–concepts like morality, ethics, spirit, experience, virtues, flourishing, or even evil and myopia–that have been traditionally neglected because they cannot be counted (or at least objectified) in social science; or worse, completely dismissed leading to the perceived poverty of the social sciences today.

Although Selznick did not specifically indicate where and how these humanist concepts may re-enter for a more complete understanding of say, a technical science of organization today, those who maintain some background knowledge in the basic assumptions of social science or organizational studies would have some inkling on where and how these concepts may apply. To say the least, for readers whose interests and knowledge lie in law, organization, sociology, moral philosophy and the history of ideas, then this book is most timely. But for readers whose interest lies in anthropology, psychology or linguistics, then the focus of this book may not match up closely with their circumscribed bodies of knowledge.

Here, let me illustrate by using one of Selznick’s meaningful distinctions in this book. In this book, Selznick makes a distinction between reason and rationality. The former is humanistic, the latter is relatively more technical and an objectified process of matching means to ends. And while rationality does not question the meaning of ends, reason does.

I rely on a concrete example (note: Selznick did not use this example) to illustrate this point. Lets say that it is perfectly responsible in the formal and legalistic sense to pursue a ‘green’ developmental project. However here by Selznick’s distinction, he would say that while it is rational to pursue this project because it is responsible and perhaps profitable, it may not be reasonable to do so, because in pursuing this project, the developmental costs entail other externalities and an overall burden on the environment. Because of this, reason trumps rationality, therefore extending the reach of responsibility (page 90).

The most satisfying things in this short book comprise of such insightful glimpses where indeed, Selznick leads us to excavate these hidden potentials of social science built upon a long history of humanistic wealth so often missed and discounted. What a reader can certainly profit from this book is relying on Selznick’s long life and experience in sieving the wheat from the chaff–in many instances he goes right to the point, and you asked yourself how you have missed this insight in all this time.

A superficial victory by Selznick here may indeed entail the dismissal of the ‘natural-science envy’; but a more resounding yet uncertain victory is Selznick’s exhortation to begin thinking and conceiving social science by this question–what is the teleology of social science? Is it to just to extend objective knowledge of the human species? Or does it ultimately reflect and thus serve the human good?
Rating: 4 / 5