Eric Boxtel says:

This book is an arbitrary and oversimplified comparison of Russia and Germany during the interwar period from an arrogant Anglo-American perspective. While some of the author’s points on Germany are worthy of consideration because he is a specialist on that country, his work on Russia is essentially a rehash of the discredited literature disseminated by hardline right-wingers like Richard Pipes. There is not anything original about the premise of this book. The demonization of Russia by likening its heroes to Hitler has been going on for decades in the West.

To start, for Gellately to liken a national hero of Russia like Lenin to Hitler amounts to irresponsible scholarship and dangerous revisionism. The Russian people venerate the memory of Lenin. His name forms part of the designation of many cities and provinces including Leningrad and Ulianovsk. In many cities there are prominent statues of him. A unique memorial and historical monument is Lenin’s Mausoleum where many people visit him. For Gellately to liken this respected Russian national hero to the man who inflicted unprecedented suffering upon Russia brings Gellateley’s academic competence into question.

Factual errors and distortions permeate this book. Gellately slanders Lenin by essentially calling him a German agent. But scholars have concluded that there was no cooperation between Lenin and German agents. Concerning the events of February 1917, Gellately asserts: “The Bolsheviks had nothing to do with this liberal revolution that swept away the Romanovs.”(p.23) But Gellately ignores evidence to the contrary. For example, on International Women’s Day in 1917, the Bolsheviks held rallies protesting the war, high prices, and hardships of women workers. These demonstrations developed into strikes and revolutionary demonstrations that roused all of Petrograd’s workers.

Equally flawed is Gellately’s analysis of fascism. Basically he blames the revolutionary movement for the rise of fascism. But this blame is misplaced. Fascism, reflecting the interests of reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie, arose not in response to revolutionary upheaval but at a time of a general crisis in capitalism. What’s disturbing is how Gellately seems to entertain Nazi delusions about a large presence of Jews in the Communist movement: “[Communist] leaders in Germany were Jewish, most notably Rose Luxemburg. Her Jewish colleagues included Leo Jogiches and Paul Levi” (p.90) But Gellately does not consider why Nazi propagandists falsely identified the Communist Party of Germany founder Karl Liebknecht as a Jew.

Gellately misrepresents and distorts the politics he seeks to analyze. In particular, he suggests that Lenin wanted to conquer the world by force of arms. But Gellately downplays the fact that it was Poland that committed aggression against Soviet Ukraine in April 1920. Lenin’s Government had repeatedly proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty on conditions favorable for Poland and the establishment of friendly relations. Moreover, Gellately omits evidence that demonstrates the contrary. In his writings, Lenin drew the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in several countries or even a single one. Communists proceed from the premise that capitalism is doomed by its own internal laws of development. Lenin always maintained that the fate of capitalism will be decided not by the export of revolution but by the class struggle under capitalism. Lenin’s Government always insisted that it supported peaceful coexistence with other governments, no matter what kind they were.

What is dishonest is how Gellately misleads readers by cherrypicking selective quotations of Lenin. He is quick to highlight a telegram by Lenin calling for the suppression of a violent kulak revolt. But historical precedent has established that the State has the right to defend itself from a violent insurrection. The leader of any other government would have taken analogous measures. One looks in vain for an account of the horrific pogroms and massacres carried out by the White armies in this book. In Transbaikalia, for example, Semenov’s regime established 11 permanent torture chambers and death houses.

This book is not worthy of serious consideration. For those with a moderate amount of knowledge on Russia, this book offers nothing new. For excellent analyses of revolutionary Russia, I recommend work by I.I. Mints, O.N. Znamensky, in Russian and E.H. Carr, Rabinowitch, and Fitzpatrick in English.
Rating: 1 / 5

Alexius says:

Gellately’s massive tome begins with a compelling thesis — that Stalin, the Communist-Fascist rivalry, and all that flowed from it, cannot be properly understood unless one begins with Lenin.

There follows in support of the thesis enough (perhaps) material to fill a short paper in a scholarly journal.

The rest is (as other customers have already noted) a turgid re-telling of Soviet and German history before and during WW2; there are no new facts, no illuminating insights, no useful syntheses, no original thoughts; in short, there is nothing here that hasn’t been said — and said better — by others.
Rating: 2 / 5